The Board of Education, Rich County School District v. Earl F. Passey, Clerk, Board of Education, Rich County School District : Brief of Defendant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1952
The Board of Education, Rich County School
District v. Earl F. Passey, Clerk, Board of Education,
Rich County School District : Brief of Defendant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Grant C. Aadnesen; Attorney for Defendant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Board of Education, Rich County v. Passey, No. 7810 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1711
7810 
Case No. 7810 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
· of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF 'EDUCATION, RICH 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, . E 
PlaintE 1 L. 
-vs.- ~PR 18 195~ 
:·.EARL F. PASSEY,_CLERK, BOARD OF-- --;-8-;;;;;;c~;~ 
EDUCATION, RICH COUNTY c ' u 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, . . 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Appearing as Attorney for Defendant 
· 921 Kearns Building, 
Salt. Lake City, Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................ 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS.......................................................... 1 
ARGUlYIENT ----------------------------------···--·--·------------·-·-·---············----···-· 2 
POINTS ARGUED : 
Section 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 as 
amended, insofar as the same purports to empower 
and authorize a board of education to issue and sell 
bonds in excess of four per cent of the value of the 
taxable property other than as ascertained by the last 
assessment for State and county purposes contravenes 
and is in violation of Article XIV, Section 4, of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah ------------------------------------·--· 2 
The provision "of the value of the taxable property 
therein the value to be ascertained by the last assess-
ment for State and county purposes" in Article XIV, 
Section 4, of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
refers to the assessment roll as valued under section 
80-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended________________ 2 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------·----------------·----------------- 15 
CASES CITED 
City of Chicago v. Fishburn, 189 Ill. 367·----------------------------------- 11 
Cutler v. Board of Education of Beaver County School 
Dist., 57 Utah 73, 192 Pac. 621. _______________________________________ 7, 9, 11 
Doon Township v. Cummins, 35 L. Ed. 1044, 142 U.S. 366, 
12 S. Ct. 220 .... --------------------------···--------------·························-----· 8 
Phelps v. City of Minneapolis, 219 N.W. 872 ................................ 15 
Scott County Auditor v. Salt Lake County et al., 58 Utah 
25, 196 Pac. 1022·--------------------------------·-·············---------------------· 7 
Smith v. Austin, 76 So. 404 .... --------------------·-··················--·--·---------- 13 
State v. Tolly, 16 S.E. 195 .............. ------·········-···----------------------------- 12 
State v. Clausen, 199 Pac. 752 .... --------···········-------------·------------------- 14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF' CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
State ex rei. Board of Education of Town of Salina v. 
Williamson, Atty. Gen., 76 Pac. 2d 384 .... ---·····--------------------3, 11 
State ex rei. Cunningham et al. v. Thomas et al., 16 Utah 
86, 50 Pac. 615 ........................ ---·---·--·--------------·--··-------------------- 7 
State of Utah v. Francis Armstrong et al., 19 Utah 117, 
56 Pac. 951 .................................. ---------·-·····---·---·-··--···--·------·--·-7, 8 
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTION CITATIONS 
Article XIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah............................ 7 
Article XIV, Section 4, Constitution of Utah ........................ 2, 6, 15 
Section 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 as 
Amended ........................................................................ 1, 2, 10, 16 
Section 80-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 as Amended............ 2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, RICH 
COrXTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff 
-vs.-
EARL F. PASSEY, CLERK, BOARD OF 
EDrCATION, RICH COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S. BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7810 
Defendant accepts plaintiff's statement of facts in 
this case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Section 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as 
amended, insofar as the same purports to empoweT 
and authorize a board of education to issue and sell 
bonds in excess of four per cent of the value of the 
taxable property other than as ascertained , by the 
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2 
last assessment for State and county purposes con-
travenes and is in violation of Article XIV, Section 
4, of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
2. The indebtedness represented by said bonds in the 
mnount of $162,000.00 would create an indebtedness 
in excess of the legal indebtedness permissible under 
Article XIV, Section 4, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
3. The provision "of the value of the taxable property 
therein, the value to be ascertained by the last as-
sessment for State and county purposes" in Article 
XIV, Section 4, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah refers to the assessment roll valued under sec-
tion 80-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant alleges that Section 75-13-12, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, as amended, insofar as the same pur-
ports to empower and authorize a board of education to 
issue and sell bonds in excess of four per cent of the 
value of the taxable property in a school district other 
than as ascertained by the last assessment for state and 
county purposes, contravenes and is in violation of Arti-
cle XIV, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. Section 4 of Article XIV of the Utah Constitution 
reads in part as follows: 
"When authorized to create indebtedness as 
provided in Section 3 of this Article, no county 
shall become indebted to an amount, including 
T. 
!no11'll 
1rele· 
D 
noni. 
··w 
··11bi 
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existing indebtedness exceeding two per centum. 
No city, town, school district or other Inunicipal 
corporation, shall become indebted to an amount, 
including existing indebtedness, exceeding four 
per centun1 of the value of the taxable property 
therein, the value to be ascertained by the last 
assessment for State and County purposes, pre-
vious to the incurring of such indebtedness; 
* * * " 
This seems clearly to Inean that what is cmnmonl~· 
known as the assessed value, the value upon which taxes 
are levied, is to 'be used for computing the debt limit. 
Defendant recognizes the fact that other jurisdic-
tions have differed as to the meaning of such a provi-
sion. We subn1it, however, that plaintiff has ignored 
certain fundamental principles of interpretation and 
plaintiff's contentions result in inconsistencies. 
In the case of State ex rel. Boa,rd of Education of 
To?£n of Salina v. Williamson, Atty. Gen., 76 Pac. 2d 
384, (Oklahoma, 1938) the Attorney General had declined 
to approve an issue of bonds voted by the school district 
of the town of Salina, giving as his reason therefor that 
the issue violated section 26 of article 10 of the Constitu-
tion in that the proposed bonds would, with existing 
indebtedness, be in excess of "five per centum of the 
valuation of the taxa:ble property therein, to be ascertain-
ed from the last assessment for State and county pur-
poses previous to the incurring of such indebtedness." 
The Attorney General construed the quoted clause to 
refer to the valuation of the taxable property against 
which taxes can be levied for general county purposes 
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4 
thereby excluding from the valuation the amounts de-
ducted for homestead exemptions. 
In holding that the Attorney General's view was 
correct the court quoted from Thornburg v. School Dist. 
No.3, 175 Mo. 12,75 S.W. 81,85: 
" 'The clause of the Constitution under dis-
cussion is not aimed at school districts alone, but 
its language is: 'No county, city, town, township, 
school district or other political corporation or 
subdivision of the state shall be allowed to be-
come indebted,' etc. No distinction is made be-
tween any of these political corporations named, 
in respect of the subject. The same ratio between 
the value of the taxable property and the tax to 
be levied is prescribed for all alike, in one group. 
If we should give to the words 'assessment for 
state and county purposes,' in this clause, the ru 
meaning that appellant's counsel think they mtjec 
should have, then we should have a school district 
empowered to become indebted to a greater de·-
gree than 5 per cent of the property liable to be 
taxed for its payment, while a county, city, town, 
or township had no such power. The plain pur-
pose of the Constitution is to forbid the incurring 
of a public debt beyond a certain per centum of 
the value of t"fi,e property taxable for its zwyment. 
That purpose must not be· lost sight of in inter-
preting any doubtful words in the clause. The 
language is not that the corporation shall not 
incur indebtedness exceeding 5 per centum of the 
value of property within its territorial limits sub-
ject to taxation for state and county purposes, 
but it is that it shall not incur such indebtedness 
'exceeding five per centum on the value of the 
taxable property therein.' Then it specifies the 
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5 
source from wlliclt information as to tlwt value 
is to be obtained; that is, the official assessment 
for state and county purJwses. If the clause 
under discussion had simply forbidden the school 
district to incur indebtedness 'exceeding five per 
centmn on the value of the taxable property there-
in,' without further demonstration, it would have 
left open the question of how that value was to be 
ascertained, and in that event the board of di-
rectors could have ordered an assessment for that 
purpose. But the la\nnakers were unwilling to 
leave it in that condition, and therefore they 
pointed out the standard by which the valuation 
was to be ascertained, to wit, the official assess-
ment for state and county taxation. The words 
'for state and county purposes,' in that clause, 
are merely descriptive of the official document 
to which reference is made.' (Emphasis ours.)" 
The court then discussed other cases dealing with the 
subject and stated: 
"While the framers of the Constitution in 
adopting section 26 of article 10 probably did not 
have the exemption of homesteads in view, they 
evidently realized that valuations would fluctuate 
from year to year, hence fixed a standard or 
mathematical formula to be used in all cases look-
ing towards a proposed indebtedness. The sum 
of existing indebtedness and the· proposed bonded 
indebtedness must not aggregate more than 5 per 
centum of the valuation of the taxable property 
in the political subdivision seeking to become in-
debted. This valuation is to be ascertained from 
the last assessment for state and county purposes. 
"In the :Missouri case first hereinabove refe·r-
red to (Thornburg v. School Dist. No. 3), it will 
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6 
be noted that the court, by excluding the value of 
the railroad property, confined the multiplicand 
to the valuations of property against which taxes 
could be levied for the particular indebtedness to 
be incurred. No good reason is urged why the 
same sort of rule should not be applied here. Fur-
thermore, we do not believe that it can be said 
that an assessed valuation to be used only for a 
part of sinking fund levy purposes can be said to 
fulfill the constitutional requirement 'for State 
and county purposes.' This phrase must mean 
not merely the valuation for some state or county 
purpose, but must include for any county pur-
pose; i.e., the valuation must be one that can be 
used in levying taxes, not for one, but for any of 
the various county purposes. 
* * * 
"Since, in this state, cities, school districts, 
and other subdivisions have not been given the 
right to make their own assessments, the list made 
for county and state purposes is the valuation for 
city and school districts, also, and is the govern-
ing assessment, 'the standard by which the valua-
tion was to be ascertained.' In such a situation 
the South Carolina Supreme Court declared: 
'Under the law as it now exists in this state gov-
erning the assessment of property for city taxes, 
no other assessment of such property for such 
taxation than the assessment of such property 
for the purpose of levying taxes for state and 
county purposes can exist.' Todd v. City of 
Laurens, 48 S.C. 395,26 S.E. 682, 684." 
Defendant submits, that in adopting Section 4 of 
jno 
[:ail 
Article XIV of the Utah Constitution, the people meant 1111) 
by the "value to be ascertained by the last assessment '\ui 
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7 
for State and county purposes" to be the assessment 
upon which wa:::; based the levy for general or current 
government expenses for the State or county. 
Plaintiff has stated in its brief (page 9) that there 
is no reported Utah decision on this question. Plaintiff 
cites the case of State ex rel. Cunningham et al. v. 
Thomas et al., 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 615 (1897) wherein the 
court quoted Article 13, Section 3 of the Constitution of 
lT tah which provides : 
"The legislature shall provide by law a uni-
form and equal rate of assessinent and taxation 
on all property in the state, according to its value 
in money, and shall prescribe by general law such 
regulations as shall secure a just valuation for 
taxation of all property; so that every person 
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to 
the value of his, her, or its property." 
Plaintiff states that plaintiff's position, if accepted by 
the court, will not violate the constitutional requirement 
that taxes and assessments be uniform. The very uni-
formity required by the constitution is the use of an ac-
cepted value for purposes of indebtedness and for pur-
poses of taxation. 
The following Utah cases consider the value of 
"taxable property" as it is assessed for purposes of 
taxation. Cutler v. Board of Education of Beaver County 
School Dist., 57 Utah 73, 192 Pac. 621 (1920); Scott 
County Auditor v. Salt Lake County et al., 58 Utah 25, 
196 Pac. 1022 (1921); State of Utah v. Francis Arm-
strong et al., 19 Utah 117, 56 Pac. 951 (1899); State ex 
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rel. Cunningham v. Thomas, supra. See also Doon Town-
ship v. Cummins, 3·5 L. Ed. 1044, 142 U.S. 366, 12 S. Ct. 
220 (1891). 
In the case of State of Utah v. Francis Arm-
strong et al., supra, the court, considering the powers of 
a board of equalization stated: 
"It is admitted by the pleadings, and because 
of the demurrer, that at the time when the reso-
lution in question was adopted, the defendants 
were sitting as the county board of equalization, 
and that the board, after carefully e·xamining the 
assessments of real estate in Salt Lake City, as 
made by the assessor, and hearing evidence with 
regard to the valuations, decided that changes in 
the valuations were necessary to correct errors 
made by him in valuing portions of real estate, 
and to make the assessments conform to the value 
of the property in money. The resolution, or 
order complained of, relates to certain portions 
or districts of the- city, and under its terms, the 
assessment on all real estate in such districts was 
raised by adding a certain percentum to the valu-
ation placed upon it by the assessor. The real 
estate of the relator was included within those 
districts, and the order was made without service 
of notice on each owner of property affected by 
the change in valuation. Counsel for the relator 
contend that the order, having been made with-
out such notice, is unauthorized by law and be-
yond the jurisdiction of the board, and is, there-
fore, void. The defendants maintain that, when 
sitting as a board of equalization, they have 
power to raise or lower the assessment in any dis-
trict in the county when necessary to make the 
valuations of property conform to its true value 
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in n1oney, and that the general notice of their 
~itting as such board is sufficient. Respecting 
the subject of taxation, it is provided in Section 
2, ~\.rticle 13 of the constitution of this State, as 
follow~: ·~\.11 property in the State, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under 
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to 
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.' 
"Section 3 of the same article, so far as mate--
rial here, reads: 'The legislature shall provide 
by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment 
and taxation on all property in the State, accord-
ing to its value in money, and shall prescribe by 
general law such regulations as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of all property; so that 
every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its prop-
erty.' 
"Comn1enting on these provisions of the con-
stitution, this court in State v. Thomas, 16 Utah 
86, observed: 'The manifest intention is that all 
taxable property shall bear its just proportion 
of the burdens of taxation. These two sections of 
the constitution harmonize with each other; and, 
by reading and considering them together, it be-
comes clear that all taxable property within this 
State must be assessed and taxed on a valuation 
fixed at its actual cash value, or as near such 
value as is reasonably practicable.' " 
In Cutler v. Board of Education of Beaver County 
School Dist., supra, this court considered Article 14, Sec-
tions 3 and 4, and held it was proper to deduct from the 
present indebtedness of the county school district the 
amount of sinking fund available for reducing indebted-
ness, and the amount assessed and levied for sinking 
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fund purposes and for funds to apply on present bond 
indebtedness, but that it was not proper to deduct from 
such present indebtedness the amount of taxes levied 
and assessed for general school purposes, since proceeds 
of such levy would not be used to reduce the assessed 
indebtedness, but would be applied to the payment of 
debts incurred during the· year. This case wa-s decided 
prior to the 1951 amendrnent to section 75-13-12, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, and the present issue was not 
before the court. The court spoke of "taxable property" i• ( 
and considered it for its purposes according to its as- tur 
sessed value: ft~ 
"The special levy of $39,166.37 for general 
school purposes for the year 1920, claimed by de-
fendant as an offset to the existing indebtedness 
of the district, however, presents much greater 
difficulties. While the levy has been legally made 
and the collection of the tax may be regarded as a 
certainty, it is difficult to conceive any theory 
upon which these taxes may be legally applied 
for the reduction of the bonded indebtedness com-
plained of by petitioner. Presumably the district, 
if not already, will be during the year 1920, under 
contractual obligations to the amount of this tax 
for the proper support and maintenance of its 
public schools. If in theory these taxes may be 
legally applied in the reduction of the existing 
bonded indebtedness of the district, then neces-
sarily, to that extent, the district, when said item 
is so applied, instantaneously becomes indebted 
in the same amount for general school purposes. 
We do not think the application of this levy to the 
existing bonded indebtedness, nor the treating 
~~]1 
am 
UDi 
!Ut 
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of thi~ ite1n a~ an offset in determining the legal 
debt lin1it of the district, would he in keeping with 
the ~pirit of our ~tate Constitution and would 
be a direct violation of the purposes for which the 
fund wa~ created and intended to be applied. In 
our judg1nent, this ite1n claimed by defendant as 
an offset to the existing bonded indebtedness of 
the district should be, for the purpose of arriving 
at the debt limit of the district, excluded." 
It would seen1 that the reasoning in the Cutler case 
is consistent with the Oklahoma case of State ex rel. 
Board of Education, sttpra. Section 4 of Article 14 of the 
Utah constitution should be held to refer to the assessed 
valuation as shown on the assessment rolls of the county. 
As stated before, this question has arisen in vari-
ous other states, and it has been decided by the supreme 
courts of Illinois, South Carolina, Alabama, Minnesota 
and Washington that the assessed value is the one that 
should be used in determining the constitutional limits 
under similar provisions of the applicable state consti-
tutions. 
In City of Chicago v. Fishburn, 189 Ill. 367, (1901) 
plaintiff taxpayers sought to enjoin the defendant city 
and its officers from issuing a bridge bond, contending 
that the city had reached and passed its constitutional 
and statutory debt limit. The issue in the case was 
whether the debt limit should be ascertained on the basis 
of the full value as determined by the assessor or upon 
the assessed value, which is one-fifth of the full value. 
The constitutional debt limit provision, section 12 of 
article 9 read as follows: 
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"No county, city, township, school district or 
other municipal corporation, shall be allowed to 
become indebted in any manner or for any pur-
pose, to an amount, including existing indebted-
ness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum 
on the value of the taxable property therein, to 
be ascertained by the last assessment for State 
and County taxes, previous to the incurring of 
such indebtedness." 
The statute in force when the constitution was 
adopted required an assessment of property at its actual 
value· and continued to so require until the Act of 1898 
which governed at the time of this case, but it was com-
mon knowledge that under the prior statute property was 
not assessed at its full value. The court stated as fol-
lows: 
"We do not think that the requirement that r1u 
the assessors shall set down the full value and 
take a fixed share thereof as the assessed valm~ 
can be held to change the meaning of the consti-
tution that the limit is to be determined by the 
assessed value. We think the constitution means 
that the limit of municipal indebtedness shall 
be computed upon and shall not exceed five per 
cent of the official estimate of the assessors for 
the preceding year as a basis for the apportion-
ment of State and county taxes. That is the 
amount which is set down in the column under the 
head of 'assessed value.'" 
In State v. Tolly, 16 S.E. 195 (1892), the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina had a similar question when 
the city council of the City of Anderson attempted to 
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use as a basis for cmnputing constitutional debt lilnit a 
figure which included the nllue of all property assessed 
for taxation as per city tax book~, plus the value of cer-
tain other property which would have been taxable by 
the city had it not been exempted temporarily from tax-
ation by ordinance. 'Yithout this additional value, the 
proposed issue would have caused the constitutional debt 
limit to be exceeded. The pertinent constitutional pro- , 
Yision read as follows : 
"Any bonded debt hereafter incurred by any 
county, municipal corporation, or political divi-
sion of this state shall never exceed eight per 
centum of the assessed value of all the taxable 
property therein." 
The court dismissed the petition for mandamus to 
comp€1 the mayor to sign the bonds saying: 
"Accordingly we find that the language used 
in the constitutional provision is not 'eight per 
centum' of the actual or real market value of the 
taxable property, but the language is, 'of the as-
sessed value of all the taxabale property therein.' 
The word 'assessed' has, and had at the time of 
the adoption of the constitutional provision now 
under consideration, a well-defined meaning when 
applied to taxable property and the framers of 
that provision must be assumed to have used it in 
the same sense in which it was used in the various 
acts of the legislature relating to the subject of 
taxation." 
The Supreme Court of Alabama reached a similar 
conclusion in Smith v. Austin, 76 So. 404 (1917). This 
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was a bill to enJOin defendants as the Commissioners 
Court of Elmore County from borrowing $30,000. Sec-
tion 224 of the constitution then in force read: 
"No county shall become indebted in an 
amount including present indebtedness, greater 
than three and one-half per centum of the as-
sessed value of the property therein." 
The statute governing assessments, Section 36A of the 
Revenue Act (Gen. Acts 1911, page 185) provided that 
all: a~~ 
]ei 
"* * * taxable property within this state shall be ~It 
assessed, for the purpose of taxation, at sixty 
per cent of its fair and reasonable cash value." 
The assessed valuation of the property was $5,917,635 
and existing county indebtedness was $240,000 which the t~! 
court said was more than 3Yz o/o of the total assessed ai 
value. It was held that the basis for computing consti-
tutional debt limit was the "value of the property as 1\' 
assessed for taxation and not its actual or cash value." 
In State v. Clausen, 199 Pac. 752 (1921), the Su-
preme Court of the State of Washington likewise held 
that where a statutory debt limit provided: 
"No taxing district shall for any purpose be-
come indebted in any manner to an amount ex-
ceeding one and one-half per centum of the last 
assessed valuation of the taxable property in such 
taxing district, without the assent of three-fifths 
of the voters therein voting at an election to be 
held for that purpose, nor in cases requiring such 
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a~~ent shall the total indebtedness at any time 
exceed five per cenhun of the last assessed valu-
ation of the taxable property in such taxing di~­
trict." 
A school district could not incur debt in excess of five 
per cent of the assessed valuation; and that the basis 
of computation was not the full value of the property 
within the district. 
Sin1ilarly in Phelps v. City of Minneapolis, 219 N.W. 
87:2 (1928), the .Jiinnesota Supreme Court held that the 
assessed value is the deter1nining factor in computing 
debt limit rather than the full cash value of the property 
where a statute specifically provided that property was 
to be assessed at specified percentages of full value. 
Defendant urges in the case at bar that the language 
of the Utah Constitution which sets the basis for as-
certaining the debt limit refers to the figure shown on the 
assessment rolls. The reason for this lies in the need for 
certainty in the determination of what that value is. 
\V ere there no fixed standards readily ascertainable and 
a matter of public record, it would give birth to mnch 
confusion and discord when one tried to determine the 
precise basis for computing the aforesaid limit. There 
is no allegation in the complaint that any assessments 
were made fraudulently or that in any way those assess-
ments are below the figure provided by law. 
CONCLUSION 
Article XIV, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution is 
not ailned at school districts alone, but its language is 
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"no city, town, school district or municipal corporation." 
To give the words "assessment for State and county pur-
poses" the meaning plaintiff requests would empower 
a school district to become indebted to a greater degree 
than cities, towns or other municipal corporations. The 
official assessment is specified, and since the official as-
sessment provision states "all taxable property must be 
assessed at forty per cent of its reasonable cash value," 
section 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended 
must be in violation of the constitution and void. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the complaint 
and the alternative extraordinary writ should be dis-
missed. Further, section 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, as amended, should be declared unconstitutional, 
null, void and of no effect. 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Appearing as Attorney for Defendant 
921 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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